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Abstract 
HAVE WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAMS IMPROVED OVER TIME IN PUTTING 
WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO WORK? 
 
Data from 76 experimental welfare-to-work programs conducted in the United States 
between 1983 and 1998 are used to investigate whether the impacts of such programs on 
employment had been improving over time and whether specific program features influencing 
such changes can be identified.   Over the period, an increasing percentage of control group 
members received services similar to those offered to program group members.  As a result, 
differential participation in program service activities between program and control group 
members decreased steadily over time.  This reduction in the net receipt of program services 
tended to reduce the impact of these programs on employment.  However, the negative influence 
of the reduced incremental services was offset by other factors that resulted in program impacts 
remaining essentially constant from 1983 to 1998.  Suggestions are made for possibly improving 
program impacts in future experiments. 
 
JEL Classification: J21, I38   1
HAVE WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAMS IMPROVED OVER TIME IN PUTTING 
WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO WORK? 
1.  Introduction 
Beginning in the late 1960s, welfare agencies in the United States started to introduce “welfare-
to-work” programs with, as the name suggests, the objective of getting as many welfare recipients as 
possible into employment.  Although the designs of these programs have varied across the states and over 
time, they typically incorporate such features as assessment of basic skills, structured job search, and 
training and education.  They also sometimes provide subsidized jobs in the private or public sector and, 
more recently, financial incentives to work (earnings disregards and supplementary payments for 
achieving certain employment goals).  Most have also been mandatory—that is, welfare recipients who 
did not cooperate could have their grants reduced or, in some cases, terminated. 
Welfare-to-work programs have played an especially important role in the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program (now called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families or TANF), 
which is the major cash public assistance program for families with children in the United States.  Over 
time, increasing funding has been channeled to welfare-to-work programs for AFDC recipients and 
increasing pressure has been put on states to have AFDC recipients partake of the services provided by 
the programs.
1  Consequently, the mandatory feature of these programs has been increasingly enforced. 
Today, mandatory welfare-to-work programs for TANF recipients are found throughout the U.S.  
                                                            
1 Mandatory programs for AFDC recipients were first established in 1967 under the Work Incentive (WIN) 
Program, but WIN never received sufficient funding to establish an effective mandate for more than a small 
minority of AFDC recipients.  The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) provided states with 
considerable flexibility in designing welfare-to-work programs, resulting in considerable increases in enrolment in 
these programs.  The 1988 Family Support Act replaced the WIN program with the Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills Training (JOBS) Program, established minimum participation rate targets for state welfare-to-work programs, 
required participation by mothers with children as young as three (and, at state option, as young as one), increased 
the sanction for nonparticipation, and, for the first time, committed federal funds to education in welfare-to-work 
programs.  Finally, among other things, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996, which replaced AFDC with TANF, required states to meet a specified schedule of minimum 
work participation rates.  In addition to unsubsidized jobs, this requirement could be met by job search, job training 
and vocational education, and subsidized jobs.   Thus, state use of welfare-to-work programs was encouraged.   
PRWORA also established lifetime time limits on how long AFDC payments could be received.   2
Given the increasing emphasis on mandatory welfare-to-work programs in the AFDC program, it 
seems reasonable to anticipate that they are effective in meeting their goal of putting AFDC recipients to 
work and that they have become progressively more effective over time.  Some light on whether this is 
actually the case is shed by a number of random assignment experimental tests of welfare-to-work 
programs for AFDC recipients that were initiated in various states between 1983 and 1998.
2  Averaging 
76 estimates from these experiments, the rate of employment in the seventh quarter after random 
assignment is found to have increased by 2.6 percentage points among those assigned to the program 
group, from 37 percent to nearly 40 percent.  While this increase is not large, it is not trivial either.  
However, as shown by Figure 1, program impacts on employment essentially remained constant over 
time, changing by a statistically insignificant .026 percentage points each year, on average.
3 
There are several potential explanations for this lack of discernable improvement in program 
impacts on employment over time.  The first and most obvious is that not much was learned over time 
about how to run welfare-to-work programs more effectively.  In other words, there is a steep learning 
curve.  The second is that welfare-to-work programs did improve over time, but earlier programs tended 
to be implemented at sites or among population groups where success came relatively easily, while later 
programs were run in sites or among population groups where success was more difficult.  For example, 
labor markets may have been tighter at the early sites or the welfare populations at these sites may have 
been more job-ready.  A third possible explanation reflects the growth in the use of welfare-to-work 
programs over time.  It seems likely that earlier programs were introduced in environments where 
                                                            
2 These experiments are described in some detail in the following section.  For purposes of this study, it would have 
been helpful if the welfare-to-work experiments covered a longer time span.  However, random assignment welfare-
to-work experiments of mandatory programs did not begin until after OBRA passed in 1981.  At this point, the 
federal government usually made random assignment experiments a condition for providing the states with the 
waivers they needed to modify their welfare-to-work programs.  It is these changes that were tested experimentally.  
Once PRWORA passed in 1996, states no longer required these waivers to change their welfare-to-work programs, 
and welfare-to-work experiments became rare. 
3 In terms of the program evaluation literature, these impacts represent impacts of the “intent to treat.”  Impacts of 
the “treatment on the treated,” which are often studied in the evaluation literature, are not identified from these 
experiments because the treatments were mandatory and, hence, impacts on the non-treated (non-participants) 
cannot be assumed to be zero.  Impacts of the “treatment on the treated” can be identified when studying voluntary 
programs for which it can be safely assumed that impacts on non-participants are zero.  For a discussion of the 
differences between voluntary and mandatory programs, see Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997).   3
employment-orientated services for AFDC services were not readily available, while later programs 
tended to replace already existing programs that also offered employment-orientated services, even 
though later programs may have provided more services or a different service configuration.  If later 
programs produced less of an increment in the receipt of employment-orientated services than earlier 
programs, it would not be surprising if program effects on employment failed to grow.  In fact, given 
these circumstances, it would be somewhat surprising if their effects did not shrink. 
Some evidence supporting the third possibility is given in Figure 2.  This figure shows how net 
overall program participation changed over time, where “overall program participation” refers to 
partaking in at least one program activity (e.g., job search assistance, basic education, vocational 
education, or work experience).
4  Net participation is defined as the participation rate of program group 
members minus the participation rate of control group members.
5 
As Figure 2 shows, overall net participation declined markedly over time (the 2.8 percentage 
point decline per year is statistically significant at the one percent level), implying that later welfare-to-
work programs resulted in smaller increments in the treatment given to the program group than earlier 
programs.  Thus, the fact that the impacts are roughly constant over time (from Figure 1) seems to imply 
that each percentage point increase in net overall program participation produced a greater increase in the 
impact in employment among later programs than among earlier programs.  It is important, therefore, to 
account for changing net participation rates when examining trends in program impacts. 
This paper uses the previously mentioned data on random assignment experimental tests of 
welfare-to-work programs for AFDC recipients to investigate the three possibilities suggested above.  The 
following section describes these data.  The third section discusses the methods we use in our 
investigation.  Findings concerning why program impacts on employment have not grown are presented 
in the fourth section.  The final section gives our conclusions. 
                                                            
4 The activities may be same or different for program and control group members.  Later in the paper, we define net 
participation rates separately by type of activity.  
5 There are fewer data points in Figure 2 than in Figure 1 because net overall participation rates are not available for 
all the programs for which employment impacts were estimated.   4
2.  Data 
This study relies on data from 21 random assignment evaluations of mandatory U.S. welfare-to-
work programs for AFDC recipients conducted in various localities (often counties) between 1983 and 
1998.  These evaluations are listed in Appendix Table A.  Although welfare-to-work programs similar to 
those evaluated continue to be widespread, random assignment evaluations of them became rare after 
1996.
6  Thus, these evaluations provide, perhaps, the best available information from which to learn about 
welfare-to-work programs for the AFDC population.  While the potential for generalizing the results of 
any given individual study is limited, the variation in program content and population characteristics 
arising from combining studies into an integrative review enormously increases the scope for 
generalization (Hall et al., 1994). 
To ensure comparability across the evaluations, inclusion criteria were established relating both 
to the kind of program being evaluated and the evaluation strategy.  First, all the evaluated welfare-to-
work programs had to include an active intervention (e.g., job search, work experience, remedial 
education, or training) that was intended to assist welfare recipients in increasing their employment.  
Second, all the programs were mandatory in the sense that recipients who did not participate in job-
search, vocational training, remedial education, or work experience as required were potentially liable for 
sanctions through the reduction or removal of their welfare benefit.  Third, all the programs were directed 
at persons receiving AFDC or TANF benefits.  Thus, welfare to work programs aimed at food stamp, 
disability, and unemployment compensation beneficiaries or at transfer recipients outside the U.S. were 
excluded. 
Finally, the evaluations were restricted to those that assigned AFDC or TANF recipients to 
program and control groups on a random basis.  Those recipients assigned to the program group were 
                                                            
6 As previously discussed, between 1982 and 1996, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
usually required random assignment evaluations of state changes in their AFDC program as a condition for 
receiving waivers permitting the changes.  We have checked with DHHS and verified that we located all the random 
assignment evaluations of mandatory welfare-to-work programs that began in the U.S. between 1982 and 1996.   
However, six random assignment evaluations could not be used because they did not estimate the program effect on 
employment in the seventh quarter after random assignment (the program effect estimate used in our empirical 
analysis).  In addition, two studies were excluded because of severe problems with their random assignment designs.   5
required to participate in the welfare-to-work program being evaluated, while those assigned to the 
control group were eligible to receive any services that existed prior to the introduction of the program.  
By comparing outcomes such as employment for the two groups, program effects (often called “impacts”) 
can be measured.  Not only is randomized assignment considered by many to be the model or “gold 
standard” of evaluation research by providing unbiased estimates of program effects, this restriction 
effectively standardized methodological procedures.  Moreover, as indicated by Appendix Table A, all 
but one of the 21 evaluations was conducted by just three research organizations.  Each of these three 
organizations has over three decades of experience in implementing and monitoring random assignment 
procedures and each has a strong reputation for performing random assignment evaluations efficiently 
and effectively. 
All the evaluations that met the criterion listed above were included in the study sample.  The 21 
evaluations provide information about 76 welfare-to-work programs that operated in 45 sites (i.e., 
separate counties or metropolitan areas).  The multi-site evaluations assessed programs that varied across 
the sites to a greater or lesser degree.  One reason the number of programs exceeds the number of sites is 
because two experimental programs were run simultaneously in some sites so that outcomes for 
participants in each program could be compared to one another, as well as to a control group.  In addition, 
some of the evaluations conducted separate analyses of one- and two-parent families.  Because programs 
in which these two family-types were enrolled often differed from those for one-parent-families in some 
of their features and were evaluated separately, we treat them as distinct programs. 
For each of the 76 programs included, our database contains estimated program impacts on 
employment in each available quarter after random assignment, as well as the levels of statistical 
significance for each of these impact estimates.  In this study, we only use the impacts estimated for the 
7
th quarter after random assignment.   
The database also contains a number of explanatory variables.  These include the year during 
which the mid-point of random assignment occurred and measures of rates of participation in various 
program activities (job search, basic education, vocational training, and work experience), rates of   6
sanctioning, the characteristics of the program population (gender, age distribution, family structure, 
employment prior to random assignment, and so forth), and socio-economic information for each of the 
program sites and for each of the evaluation years (e.g., the site unemployment and poverty rates, the 
percentage of the workforce engaged in manufacturing employment, the annual rate of change in 
manufacturing employment, and so forth).  Although most of the study data were extracted directly from 
the reports on each of the 21 evaluations, the site social-economic information was obtained from various 
government sources, such as U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics websites.  
Because members of the control group often had access to services similar to those received by the 
program group and were also subject to sanctions, separate estimates of rates of participation in the sorts 
of services provided by the program and of sanction receipt for both the program and control groups are 
available in our database, as are estimates of net program effects on these rates, which are measured as 
differences between the program and control group rates.  
3.  A Model Explaining Variation in Welfare-to-Work Program Effects 
The data in Figures 1 and 2, though suggestive do not represent a formal analysis of how program 
effects vary over time.  The program effects in Figures 1 and 2 are based on estimates from evaluations 
with varying sample sizes and this variation in sample size needs to be taken into account in examining 
variation in program effects over time.  Furthermore, other features of the evaluations vary across studies, 
including types of services offered, characteristics of the tested samples, and the economic environment in 
which the evaluations took place. 
A procedure well suited to examining the problem at hand is meta-analysis.  In the meta-analysis 
literature, two types of statistical models have been commonly used.  These models are termed “fixed 
effect” and “random effects” models, although as will be discussed below, the latter is really a 
generalization of the former and is more appropriately termed a “mixed effect” model. 
Both the fixed effects and random effects models take into account the fact that the individual 
underlying estimated employment effects are based on different sample sizes, and hence have different 
levels of statistical precision.  It would not make sense to weigh two studies equally that produce   7
estimates having very different levels of statistical precision.  For example, suppose one study produced 
an estimated employment effect of a particular training program of 10 percent, but this estimate was very 
imprecise and not statistically significant because of a small sample size of, say, only 500 persons. 
Suppose another study produced an estimated effect of 2 percent for the same program, but was very 
precisely estimated because of a much larger sample of, say, 4,500 persons.  If we did not take into 
account the sample sizes, we might conclude that the effect of the program was 6 percent (the unweighted 
mean of the estimates produced by the two studies).  However, the true effect is probably closer to 2 
percent because of the total sample used in the two studies (5,000), 90 percent was from the latter study. 
In order to account for sampling variation across studies with varying sample sizes, the following 
statistical model is specified:
7 
(1)     Ti = T
*
i + ei, where 
Ti is the estimated welfare-to-work program effect, T
*
i is the “true” program effect (obtained if the entire 
target population was evaluated), and ei is the error due to estimation on a sample smaller than the 
population.  It is assumed that ei has a mean of zero and a variance of vi. 
In order to provide an estimate of the mean effect that takes into account the fact that vi varies 
across studies (that is, vi is smaller for studies with larger samples), a weighted mean can be calculated, 
with the weight being the inverse of the vi, 1/vi.  If sampling variation were the only source of variation in 
the training program effects, weighting in this manner produces the most precise estimate of the mean 
program effect. 
Using the estimated variances from each study produces a weighted mean employment impact 
estimate of 2.8 percentage points (compared to an unweighted mean impact estimate of 2.6 percentage 
points).   Thus, the weighted mean is close to the unweighted mean.  Both the unweighted and weighted 
mean impact estimates are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
                                                            
7 Much of the remainder of this section is drawn from Raudenbush (1994).   8
Sampling variation is not the only source of variation in estimates across studies, however.  There 
are two other sources of variation that are taken into account in meta-analysis.  One source has to do with 
the fact that the estimates are produced for different programs, over different time periods, for different 
population groups, in different locations, and so forth.  The other source arises because there are 
unmeasured factors that cause variation in program effects.  These could be related to staff attitudes 
toward welfare recipients and other features of the welfare-to-work program or environment that were not 
measured in conducting the program evaluations. 
Each of these sources of variation may be identified by extending the model described by 
equation (1) in the following way: 
(2)     T
*
i = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i + ....... βpXpi + ui, 
where β0 is the model intercept, the Xis are observed characteristics of the studies that cause variation in 
the true program effects T
*
i , the βs are coefficients representing the marginal effects of the characteristics 
on the true program effect, and ui is a random error term with variance σ
2, representing unmeasured 
factors causing variation in program effects.  Equation (2) is sometimes termed a “structural” model in the 
meta-analysis literature. 
Together, equations (1) and (2) constitute a statistical model of the variation in program effects.  
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) yields the mixed effect model we estimate: 
(3)     Ti = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i + ....... βpXpi + ei +  ui. 
In equation (3), there are three potential sources of variation in Ti  – sampling error (the ei), 
observed characteristics of the studies (the Xis), and random error (the ui).  If the βs are not zero, but ui is 
identically zero for all studies, then the model is referred to as a “fixed effects” model.  In the fixed effect 
model, there are two sources of variation in the estimated program effects – sampling error and variation 
in observed characteristics.  The weight used in estimating the fixed effects model is the inverse of the 
sampling variance (1/vi), because the only source of variation in the estimates, other than the Xis, is the 
sampling variance.  If the βs are not zero and ui, as well as ei, varies across studies, then the model is 
referred to as a “mixed effects” model.  In the mixed effects model, there are three sources of variation in   9
the estimated program effects – sampling error, variation in observed characteristics, and random error 
caused by variation in unobserved characteristics.  The weight used in estimating the mixed effects model 
is the inverse of the sum of the sampling error plus the random effects error (1/[vi + σ
2]).   Clearly, the 
fixed effects model is a special case of the mixed effects model.  It is possible to test statistically for the 
significance of the fixed and random effects. 
To estimate the mixed effects model, an estimate of σ
2 is obviously needed.  Raudenbush (1994) 
describes a variety of procedures for estimating the model, including method of moments estimators and 
maximum likelihood estimators.  One procedure, based on a method of moments estimator, involves the 
following steps.  First, equation (2) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Then, the mean 
square residual variance from the regression is used to calculate an estimate of σ
2, based on the following 
formula: 
(4)    s
2  = MSR - k/(n-p-1), 
where MSR is the mean square residual from the OLS regression
8 and k is a constant given by the 
following formula (see Raudenbush, 1994, p. 319): 
(5)     k = Σvi - trace[XrVX(XrX)
-1], 
where the boldface refers to matrix notation for the vector of p explanatory variables (the Xi) and the n 
sampling variances (the vi), and trace is the sum of the diagonal elements of the resulting matrix.  
Essentially, the estimate of σ
2 is based on the total residual variance from the OLS regression less an 
adjustment term based on a weighted average of the sampling errors (vi) for each observation.  After 
obtaining the estimate of σ
2, the model is re-estimated by weighted least squares, using 1/[s
2 + vi] as 
weights. 
Using the estimated variances (vi) from each study and the method of moments estimator of σ
2 
described by equations (4) and (5) as weights produces a mixed employment impact estimate of 2.84, 
                                                            
8 The MSR is calculated by dividing the residual sum of squares by the number of degrees of freedom in the 
regression, which is the number of observations (n) minus the number of βs estimated in the model (p+1).   10
which is very close to the fixed effect impact estimate.  Like the unweighted and fixed effect impact 
estimates, the mixed effect mean impact estimate is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
In addition to the fixed and mixed effects models, there is a third model, called the “unweighted 
model,” in which it is assumed that there is no variation in the vi across studies.  If all studies have the 
same sample sizes, then the unweighted model is appropriate and can be estimated by a simple ordinary 
least squares regression of the program effects on the observed characteristics.  Of course, if standard 
errors of the program effects are not available for the studies, the unweighted model must be used.  
Sometimes, however, the unweighted model is appropriate if there is uncertainty about the accuracy of 
the estimated standard errors from the underlying studies. 
For completeness, we estimated all three models (the unweighted, fixed effects, and mixed 
models).  Using the test suggested by Raudenbush (1992, p. 314), the unweighted and fixed effect models 
were emphatically rejected in favor of the mixed model for almost every model specification.
9  
Accordingly, in the remainder of this paper, we only present results from the mixed model (estimates of 
the unweighted and fixed effects models are available from the authors on request). 
4.  Findings 
It was suggested in Section 1 that the apparent lack of a positive time trend in the impacts on 
employment of the welfare-to-work programs in our sample could be due to the earlier programs being 
located in places or among populations groups where success came relatively easier than it did for later 
programs.  This possibility is investigated in the first of the two mixed effect model regressions reported 
in Table 1.  This regression uses the impact on employment in the seventh quarter after random 
assignment as the dependent variable and a time trend variable that equals one for programs initiated in 
1983 (the year in which random assignment occurred in the earliest of our 76 programs), two for 
programs started in 1984, and so-forth.  The remaining variables attempt to control for several site 
                                                            
9 The test for the mixed effect model is a test of the hypothesis that sigma-square is zero.  The test statistic is given 
by Q=Σwi(Ti - β0 - β1X1 - β2X2 -..... βpXp)
2, where wi = 1/vi.  This statistic is approximately distributed as chi-square, 
with n-p-1 degrees of freedom.   11
characteristics measured during the seventh quarter after random assignment (the poverty rate, the 
unemployment rate, and the annual rate of change in manufacturing employment) and several 
characteristics of the samples used in the program evaluations (the percentage of each sample that worked 
the year prior to random assignment, the average age of the sample members at the time of random 
assignment, and whether the evaluated program enrolled one- or two-parent families).   
As discussed in Section 1, without these controls, the time trend is positive, although very small 
and statistically insignificant.  If the time trend was understated because the earlier programs in our 
sample were implemented in sites or among population groups where impacts on employment were likely 
to be relatively large, the coefficient on the time trend variable should become more positive once site and 
sample characteristics are controlled for.  However, it actually moves in the opposite direction, becoming 
negative, although remaining very small and statistically insignificant.  As indicated in Table 1, none of 
the site and population characteristics are statistically significant either.  Thus, the findings do not appear 
to suggest that the time trend is understated. 
The second regression in Table 1, adds a number of explanatory variables that measure the 
characteristics of the experimental welfare-to-work programs.  Four of these variables are estimates of net 
(i.e., program group minus control group) participation rates in various program service components (job 
search, basic education, vocational training, and work experience).  A fifth variable measures the net 
program sanction rate for each program.
 10  There were some missing values for the participation and 
sanction rate variables, generally fewer than 20 percent, which were predicted by regression equations 
that are described later.  The remaining two variables are dummies indicators of whether each program 
tested financial incentives and time limits.
 11  That is they indicate whether members of the program group 
                                                            
10 There were some missing values for the participation and sanction rate variables.  These missing values were 
predicted by regression equations that are described later.  The number of missing values varies by variable but is 
generally under 20 percent.  
11 The word “tested” is used to indicate that members of the program group were eligible for financial incentive or 
subject to time limits and members of the control group were not.   12
were eligible for a financial incentive under certain conditions or whether they were subject to time limits 
and members of the control group were not. 
As seen in Table 1, with the exception of the coefficient on vocational training, all the 
coefficients on the seven program characteristic variables are positive, implying that greater incremental 
use of most program components tends to increase the impact of welfare-to-work programs on 
employment.  However, only the coefficients on the net rate of participation in job search and on the net 
sanction rate are statistically significant at conventional levels.
12  Once program characteristics are held 
constant, the coefficient on the time trend variable becomes positive and considerably larger in magnitude 
than in either Figure 1 or in the first regression.  One possible interpretation of a positive time trend once 
program characteristics are held constant is that the administration of welfare-to-work programs improved 
over time.  However, the coefficient on the time trend variable is still not close to being statistically 
significant.
13 
The positive coefficients in Table 1 on all of the net participation rates except the one for 
vocational education suggest why the impact of welfare-to-work programs on employment may not have 
increased over time.  If these participation rates declined over time, then they would retard any growth in 
program impact on employment.  Some evidence on this issue is presented in Table 2.   
Each of the estimates in Table 2 is a coefficient on the time trend variable from a different mixed 
effect model regression in which the dependent variable is a participation rate or a sanction rate and the 
                                                            
12 The coefficient on the testing of financial incentives is extremely small, implying that financial incentives have 
had no effect on the employment impacts of welfare-to-work programs.  This may appear surprising because 
financial incentives are specifically designed to encourage employment.  However, the evidence from cost-benefit 
studies of these welfare-to-work-programs is that financial incentives increase the incomes of welfare recipients by 
roughly the amount they cost the government (Greenberg, Deitch, and Hamilton, 2009 and Greenberg and Cebulla, 
2008).  The regular AFDC and TANF programs, in contrast, raise the incomes of welfare recipients by considerably 
less than they cost the government because they create incentives for recipients to work less.  Thus, financial 
incentives appear to be a relatively efficient means of transferring income to the working poor.  Moreover, some 
types of financial incentive programs, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Canada’s Self-Sufficiency 
Project (SSP), have been found to significantly increase employment of single parent mothers on welfare 
(Michalopoulos et al., 2002; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001).  However, the financial incentives in the EITC and SSP 
programs are quite different than the financial incentives tested in the U.S. welfare-to-work experiments. 
13 Estimates of the fixed effect model (available from the authors on request) indicate a positive time trend that is 
somewhat larger than the time trend from the mixed effect model (.115 compared to .054), but it is still not 
statistically significant.   13
explanatory variables are identical to those used in the first regression in Table 1.
14  Each value can be 
interpreted as an estimate of the change in a participation rate or the sanction rate over one year. 
The first column in Table 2 provides estimates of time trends for the program groups in the 
evaluated welfare-to-work programs.  Three of the four coefficients on participation in particular services 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or less.  Perhaps surprisingly, these estimates imply that 
these persons were less likely to receive program services if they were enrolled in a later program than if 
they were enrolled in an earlier program.  Although not statistically significant, the positive coefficient for 
the sanction rate implies that members of the program group were more likely to be sanctioned in later 
programs. Estimates of time trends for the randomly assigned control groups appear in the second 
column.  Unsurprisingly, the time trends for members of the control group are positive.  Moreover, the 
time trends for overall participation, job search, and work experience are highly significant.  Estimates of 
time trends for the net participation and net sanction rates are shown in the third column.  Given the 
declining participation in program services by the program group and rising participation by the control 
group, it is not surprising that the net rates of participation in program services are higher for earlier 
programs than for later programs, and except for basic education, significantly so.  Although the 
estimated coefficient on the net sanction rates is not statistically significant, the positive point estimate 
suggests that there may have been an upward time trend in net sanction rates.  The fourth column in Table 
2 shows the number of net participation and sanction rate estimates that are available in our database.  As 
indicated, these numbers are somewhat smaller than the 76 available estimates of program impacts on 
employment. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the change in the participation and sanction rates during the 16 
years between the time random assignment of the earliest welfare-to-work program occurred (early 1983) 
and the time random assignment of the most recent program occurred (late 1998).  The values in the first 
three columns were computed by simply multiplying the estimates in Table 2 by 16.  Column (D) was 
                                                            
14 The full regression results are available from the authors upon request.   14
computed by subtracting Column (B) from Column (A).  The resulting values provide an alternative to 
the estimates appearing in Column (C) of the change between 1983 and 1998 in the net participation and 
sanction rates.   Except for basic education, the estimates of net participation rates are very similar in 
Columns (C) and (D), suggesting that the estimates in the first two columns are reasonably accurate.  
Column (E) provides the mean values of the participation and sanction rate variables from the mixed 
effect model.  As a comparison of either Column (C) or Column (D) with Column (E) suggests, the 
negative changes in net participation rates between 1983 and 1998 were quite large relative to the mean 
net participation rates.  The net sanction rate, in contrast, was relatively stable over time. 
How did the rather large negative changes in net participation in welfare-to-work program 
services affect the success of the evaluated programs in increasing employment?  This can be seen by 
multiplying each of these changes (as shown in Columns (C) and (D) of Table 3) by its corresponding 
coefficient estimate in Table 1, recalling that each of these coefficients provide an estimate of how a one 
percentage point change in a net participation rate affects the impact of welfare-to-work programs on 
employment.  The results of these calculations are presented in the first two columns of Table 4.  They 
suggest that the reduction in net participation in program services tended to retard growth in the impact of 
welfare-to-work programs on employment.  Most of this effect results because net participation in job 
search, which has a substantial and statistically significant positive influence on employment impacts, 
shrank considerably between 1983 and 1998.  Viewed somewhat differently, the results in the first two 
columns of Table 4 imply that had net participation in program activities not diminished between 1983 
and 1998, the impact of welfare-to-work programs on employment would have grown by about two-and-
half percentage points—that is, the mean mixed employment impact estimate of 2.8 percentage points, 
which was mentioned earlier, would have been approximately twice as large.  
As previously discussed, the shrinkage in net participation in the services provided by welfare-to-
work programs occurred because participation among those not assigned to the programs (the control 
groups) tended to “catch up” with the program groups.  This resulted both because control group 
members tended over time to have received more of the sorts of services offered by the experimental   15
programs and because program group members tended over time to have received fewer of the services.  
What would have happened if receipt of program services by members of the control groups had 
remained at their 1983 level?  This question is addressed by multiplying each of the changes in 
participation rates for program group members (as shown in Column (A) of Table 3) by its corresponding 
coefficient estimate in Table 1.  The findings from this calculation appear in the third column of Table 4. 
They imply that, by itself, the reduction in the receipt of program services by members of the program 
groups had a relatively modest effect of slightly less than one percentage point on program impacts on 
employment.  Thus, the increase in the receipt of these sorts of services by control group members was 
probably relatively more important, especially their highly statistically significant increase in receiving 
job search services. 
The findings in the first two columns of Table 4 suggest that the reductions in net participation in 
welfare-to-work program services tended to cause the impact of the programs on employment to fall over 
time.  However, in the introduction to this paper, we observed that there was virtually no time trend in 
these impacts.  Thus, the influence of the negative changes in net participation in welfare-to-work 
program services must have been offset by other factors.   
What were these other factors?  The evidence here is far weaker than that for the effects of the net 
reductions in participation in welfare-to-work program services.  However, some hints appear in the 
second regression reported in Table 1.  For example, the positive and marginally statistically significant 
coefficient on the net sanction rate implies that the rise in this rate between 1983 and 1998, which is 
shown in Table 3, should have increased the impact of welfare-to-work programs on employment over 
time.  However, if these two values are multiplied by one another, the positive effect on the employment 
impact is less than one quarter of one percentage point (.219=.148 x 1.48).  Although the net sanction rate 
probably grew over time, it did not grow by very much.  A second possibility is suggested by the positive 
coefficient on the time trend variable in the second regression in Table 1.  Earlier, we suggested that this 
positive sign may indicate that the administration of welfare-to-work programs improved over time.  
Although very imprecisely estimated, the time trend point estimate implies that the impact on   16
employment could have grown by nearly a percentage point (0.864=16x.054) between 1983 and 1996 for 
this reason.  A third possible factor is suggested by the positive, although statistically insignificant, 
coefficient in Table 1 on the testing of time limits.   Time limits were not tested experimentally until 
1994, but over 40 percent of the experimentally evaluated programs that were initiated between 1994 and 
1998 (13 of 30) did test this provision.
15  The regression coefficient of 1.887 on time limits in Table 
1implies that growth in the use of time limits from zero to around 40 percent would have caused the 
impact of welfare-to-work programs on employment to increase by about three quarters of a percentage 
point.  Although the analysis of two of the three factors just considered is based on statistically 
insignificant regression coefficients, together, the three appear to offset much of the negative influence of 
the reduction over time in net participation in welfare-to-work program services. 
  Conclusions 
In this paper we have used data from 76 experimental welfare-to-work programs conducted in the 
United States between 1983 and 1998 to investigate whether impacts of such programs on employment 
have been improving over time and whether specific program features influencing such changes can be 
identified.   Over the period covered by our data, an increasing percentage of control group members were 
receiving services similar to those offered to program group members.  As a result, net participation in 
program service activities, and hence the “intensity” of the treatment, decreased steadily over time.  This 
reduction in the net receipt of program services tended to reduce the impact of these programs on 
employment.  However, program impacts on employment were essentially constant from 1983 to 1998, 
although there was a very small upward trend.  This may have occurred because the negative influence of 
the reduced incremental services were offset by an increase in the use of sanctions, the introduction of time 
limits, and perhaps improved administration of the programs, all of which tended to increase program 
impacts.    
                                                            
15 Although these 13 programs tested provisions that limited the amount of time individuals remained eligible for 
AFDC benefits, they differed in various respects from one another and from the lifetime time limit included in the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996.   17
Findings from this study imply that there could have been a considerably larger upward trend in 
program impacts on employment had more effort been made to engage program group members in the 
welfare-to-work experiments in job search.  However, although providing this service is relatively 
inexpensive,
16 participation by program group members appears to have actually fallen over time. 
Since 1998, several additional welfare-to-work experiments have been conducted.  One of the 
largest of these is the so-called ERA (Employment Retention and Advancement) experiments that took 
place in 14 sites throughout the U.S. (Hendra et al., forthcoming).  The results from ERA have only 
recently become available and they indicate very small impacts on employment in almost every site tested 
(out of 14 sites, only 3 had statistically significant impacts on employment).  One of the reasons for the 
small impacts may be fairly large receipt of services by control group members and hence, small impacts 
on net participation rates among program group members.  In only 4 out of the 14 sites, for example, was 
there a statistically significant difference between program group and control group members in the receipt 
of job search services and in only 3 out of the 14 sites was there a statistically significant difference 
between program group and control group members in the receipt of education and training services.
17  
Given this relatively small “intensity” of treatment in the ERA experiments, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the impacts on employment were also small.  From this perspective, the findings from ERA are 
consistent with the results presented in this paper. 
Our results have important implications for the design and conduct of future experimental 
welfare-to-work programs.  First, as has been pointed out by others but bears repeating, it is important to 
closely monitor the behavior of the control group because their experiences in the welfare system can have 
important implications for the interpretation of estimated program impacts.  Second, designers of future 
                                                            
16 For evidence, see Table 7 of Greenberg and Cebulla (2008). 
17 The generally small differences between the program and control groups in the receipt of these services were by 
intention.  These were pre-employment services, but as its names implies, the objective of the ERA experiments was 
to test services that were designed to improve the post-employment experience of the program group such as career 
assessment, planning, assistance in finding a better job while working, and advice about problems on the job.  
Although few control group members received these post-employment services, receipt was also low among ERA 
program group members and differences in receipt between program and control group members were statistically 
significant in less than half the sites for most of the post-employment service measures.     18
experiments should ensure that the features of the programs they are testing represent significant 
departures from the features being received by control group members.  Otherwise, the “intensity” of the 
treatment may not be large and the experimental program may have relatively little impact on employment 
and other outcomes of policy interest.  Finally, most of the recent welfare-to-work programs being tested 
in the U.S. have been based on models designed mainly by welfare agencies, with limited input from the 
research organization conducting the evaluation.  In cases where the evaluators have had a stronger hand in 
the design of the experimental treatment, impacts have tended to be larger.
18  In future experiments, 
evaluators need to play a more significant role in the design of the treatment, to help ensure that, at least in 
principle, the treatment has the potential to be cost effective. 
 
   
                                                            
18 For example, a recent welfare-to-work program conducted in Canada, the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), was 
designed jointly by the evaluators and the government agency sponsoring the evaluation, and the “treatment” 
represented a significant departure from what the control group was receiving.  As a result, the experiment yielded 
sizable employment impacts (see Michalopoulos, et al., 2002).   19
TABLE 1 
MIXED EFFECT REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF PROGRAM AND CONTEXTUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON PROGRAM IMPACTS ON EMPLOYMENT IN THE 7
TH QUARTER 






Number of years since 1982  -0.004  0.114  0.054    0.189 
Two parent family target group = 1  -1.004  1.266  -2.150    1.388 
Average age of target group  0.078  0.130  0.171    0.182 
Percentage of target group with recent   
employment -0.045  0.037  -0.013    0.039 
Annual percentage change in local manufacturing 
employment  0.052 0.132  0.035    0.129 
Poverty rate (%)  -0.070  0.104  -0.007    0.115 
Unemployment rate (%)  -0.195  0.212  -0.182    0.212 
Percentage Sanctioned (net)      0.148  *  0.085 
Percentage ever participated in job 
search (net)      0.077  **  0.039 
Percentage ever participated in basic education (net)      0.039    0.054 
Percentage ever participated in vocational education 
(net)     -0.187    0.145 
Percentage ever participated in work experience 
(net)     0.035    0.107 
Financial incentive tested =1      0.002    1.105 
Time Limit tested =1      1.887    1.506 
Constant 4.872  5.160  -3.537    6.208 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 2 
MIXED EFFECT REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE ANNUAL CHANGE IN 
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND SANCTION RATES 
(Standard Errors Appear in Parentheses) 













Overall  Participation  0.023   2.724 ***  -2.861 ***  49 
  (0.445)   (0.455)   (0.367)    
Participation in Job Search  -0.710  *  1.508  ***  -2.041  ***  65 
  (0.437)   (0.287)   (0.431)    
Participation in Basic Education  -1.421  ***  0.202    -0.644    65 
  (0.492)   (0.220)   (0.399)    
Participation in Vocational 
Education  -0.341   0.043   -0.255 *  65 
  (0.376)   (0.374)   (0.144)    
Participation  in  Work  Experience  -0.386 *  0.362 ***  -0.712 ***  73 
  (0.202)   (0.070)   (0.172)    
Receipt of Sanctions  0.186   0.080   0.093   60 
  (0.326)   (0.157)   (0.235)    
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 





ESTIMATED CHANGES IN PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND SANCTION RATES BETWEEN 1983 AND 1998 
(Standard Errors Appear in Parentheses) 
 
      
 
  Alternative 
Net 










  Col (A) - 
Col (B) 
 Mean  Net 
Rates 
 
 (A)    (B)    (C)    (D)    (E)   
Overall Participation  0.36    43.59  ***  -45.78  ***  -43.23  ***  21.29  *** 
 (7.12)    (7.28)    (5.87)    (10.18)    (1.32)   
Participation in Job Search  -11.36  *  24.14  ***  -32.65  ***  -35.49  ***  19.91  *** 
  (6.99)    (4.60)    (6.90)    (8.37)    (1.52)   
Participation in Basic Education  -22.74  ***  3.24    -10.30    -25.98  ***  7.27  *** 
  (7.87)    (3.52)    (6.38)    (8.62)    (1.42)   












  (6.01)    (5.99)    (2.30)    (8.49)    (0.51)   
Participation in Work Experience  -6.17  *  5.79  ***  -11.39  ***  -11.96  ***  3.07  *** 
  (3.24)    (1.12)    (2.75)    (3.48)    (0.60)   
Receipt of Sanctions  2.98    1.29    1.48    1.69    6.06  *** 
  (5.22)    (2.51)    (3.75)    (5.79)    (0.86)     22
  
TABLE 4 
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PARTICIPATION RATES ON 
PROGRAM IMPACTS ON  EMPLOYMENT 
   
 
Based on  
 Assumes 
Control 
  Based on    Alternative    Participation 





Participation in Job Search  -2.50  *  -2.72  *  -0.87 
 (1.41)    (1.57)    (0.75) 
Participation in Basic Education  -0.40    -1.02    -0.89 
 (0.70)    (1.51)    (1.33) 
Participation in Vocational Education  0.76    1.15    1.02 
 (0.81)    (2.20) (1.63) 
Participation in Work Experience  -0.40    -0.42    -0.22 
 (1.25)    (1.33)    (0.75) 








    





Appendix Table A 
 
U.S. WELFARE-TO-WORK EVALUATIONS INCLUDED IN THE DATABASE 
PROGRAM TITLE  SHORT 
PROGRAM NAME
EVALUATOR MID-POINT  OF 
RANDOM 
ASSIGNMENT 
Greater Avenues for Independence Program  GAIN (California)  MDRC  1989 
Job Search and Work Experience in Cook County  Cook County  MDRC  1985 
Community Work Experience Demonstrations  West Virginia  MDRC  1983 
WORK Program  Arkansas  MDRC  1983 
Employment Initiatives  Baltimore  MDRC  1983 
Saturation Work Initiative Model  SWIM (San Diego)  MDRC  1985 
Employment Services Program  Virginia  MDRC  1984 
Project Independence (Florida’s JOBS Program)  Florida  MDRC  1991 
Jobs First  Connecticut  MDRC  1996 
The Family Transition Program  FTP  (Florida)  MDRC  1994 
The Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN Evaluation  Los Angeles  MDRC  1996 
The San Diego Job Search and Work Experience 
Demonstration 
San Diego  MDRC  1983 
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies  NEWWS  MDRC  1993 
Minnesota Family Investment Program  MFIP  MDRC  1994 
Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project.  Vermont  MDRC  1995 
Teenage Parent Demonstration  Teenage Parents  Mathematica Policy 
Research (MPR) 
1988 
Indiana’s Initial Welfare Reform Program   Indiana I  Abt Associates  1995 
Indiana’s Modified Welfare Reform Program  Indiana II  Abt Associates  1998 
To Strengthen Michigan Families  TSMF(Michigan)  Abt Associates  1993 
Family Investment Program  FIP (Iowa)  MPR  1994 
California Work Pays Demonstration Program  CWPDP  UCLA School of Public 
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